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This paper was presented on 3 September 1999 at the European Economic
Society meetings in Santiago de Compostella. The ideas discussed here were rst
presented at the conference on the Universal Service Obligation held at the London
Business School on 29 April 1999.Thanks to Len Waverman for forcing me to think
about these issues as well as to the participants at the conference and to Claude
Crampes and Robin Mason for very useful comments. Thanks also to Mary Kay
Perkins whose paper (Perkins, 1999) provided inspiration.
1 Introduction
In recent months, we have witnessed much debate about the desirability of
some type of Universal Service requirement for the Internet. The literature
has identied four main reasons
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for imposing universal service requirements:
income redistribution, the presence of \merit goods", regional policy and
network externalities.
The aim of this paper is to present a simple model of network externali-
ties when two technologies are in competition for broadcasting information,
and to show that there are reasons to believe that the value of the network
is increasing fast when one reaches close to 100% connection. This might
provide the basis for a policy of universal access.
The basic idea of the theory is very simple. In a network such as the
Internet, there must be decreasing returns to scale in the provision of access
to a greater proportion of the population: as more and more persons are
connected, the network reaches consumers who attach smaller and smaller
value to the services of the network.
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However, once we get close to universal
access, there are new services which can be oered, or rather there exist new
opportunities to deliver what I will call broadcasting services. Take the
example of a school that needs to send grades at the home of its pupils.
It normally sends them through \snail mail". If enough households were
connected to the Internet, it would be benecial to send it by E-mail, as one
saves on postage and gains in speed and exibility. It is easy to imagine a
number of such examples, telephone and electricity bills being one of them
(according to Gates (1999), the US Commerce Department estimates that
when consumers are able to pay bills on line, annual processing costs will
drop by $20 billion). The aim of section 2 is to build a simple model that
shows that under these circumstances, the social value of the network as a
function of the number of participants can be concave for small numbers
of participants, but have a sharply increasing section for larger numbers.
(Perkins (1999) studies the use of electronic mail to fulll the postal USO.)
In section 3, I review the model in order to show that these network ex-
ternalities can create coordination failures, even if the senders of information
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Each of these reasons could be the topic of a long discussion. The fact that they are
listed does not necessarily imply that I agree that the policies based on these reasons are
sound.
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There is a counterbalancing eect: as the size of the network increases, an additional
member provides the service of being accessible to more and more people. This is the
basis of Metcalfe's law that states that the value of a network is approximately equal to
the square of the number of members. In reality, for each member the value of an extra
potential connection also decreases with the size of the network, and I believe that in most
cases, once the network has reached a critical size, the statement of the text if valid.
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maximize social welfare. I discuss the techniques that the government could
use to mitigate the resulting ineciencies, and show that when there are too
few connections to the network, it is more ecient to subsidize the senders
of messages than the recipients.
2 The shape of network externalities
2.1 The model
We build a simple model in which there are two techniques for \broadcast-
ing" information, a postal service and the Internet, and we compute the
social welfare generated by this broadcasting as a function of the number of
subscribers to Internet services.
A public minded rm must send a message to every agent in the pop-
ulation, and we will call these agents recipients. The hypothesis that the
message must be sent to all the recipients is a consequence of the fact that
the social value of sending a message V is larger than all the costs we con-
sider. To make things as simple as possible, we will assume that V = V
s
+V
r
,
where V
s
is the value to the sender of receiving a message and V
r
is the value
to recipients of receiving it, and that both V
s
and V
r
are large. If messages
are not sent through the Internet, they are sent through the postal service,
where the cost to the sender is  per message. This cost is the total cost
of sending the message, including not only postage, but also the cost of ac-
quiring envelope and paper, printing the letter, stung the envelope, and so
on.
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The Internet service which can be accessed through two technologies: a
constant returns to scale (CRS) technology with a cost c per message and
an increasing returns to scale (IRS) technology with a xed cost F and a
cost of 0 per consumer. We want to think about these costs in the following
way. The sender is already connected to the Internet for other purposes, and
the technologies are technologies of preparation of messages. With the CRS
technology, messages are targeted one by one to their specic recipient. With
the IRS technology, the preparation of Internet messages is directly linked
to the databases of the organization. There would be basically no changes
to the theory that follow if there were a modicum of returns to scale, with a
small xed cost, in the CRS technology
4
.
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In reality, there are probably increasing returns to scale in the sending of messages
through the postal service. We assume that are primarily due to the fact that the sunk
xed costs are less than proportional to the number of recipients, and that these costs
have already been sunk
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The theory could also be extended to the case where there are many technologies,
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The consumers have a type v uniformly distributed on the segment
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[0; 1],
which represents there preferences for receiving Internet messages as opposed
to postal messages. The consumer of type v has a willingness to pay equal
to  + tv for receiving a Internet rather than a postal message. We assume
that the constant t is positive, but there are no restrictions on the sign of  .
We assume that the consumers of type v 2 [1   a; 1] are connected to
the Internet, and we want to compute the welfare generated by the presence
of the Internet as a function of a, that is as a function of the proportion of
the population connected to the Internet. I make the hypothesis that it is
the receivers with a high willingness to pay for Internet messages that are
connected: this is reasonable, as they are the more likely to be willing to pay
the cost of connection. This hypothesis is derived from more fundamental
data in section 3.
The sender maximizes social surplus, and we assume that the messages
are sent eciently to the \right" recipients. One simple hypothesis that
ensures this is that the recipients are charged the relevant marginal cost, 0,
 or c for receiving a message.
2.2 Welfare with the CRS technology
Let us rst compute social welfare when the sender uses the CRS technology
in order to send messages. The social benet of sending an Internet message
rather than a postal message to a recipient of type v is  + tv  c+. Hence,
recipients whose type v satises
v 
c     
t
(1)
will receive Internet messages while the others will receive postal messages.
To make things interesting, we assume that inequality (1) is strictly satised
for v = 1, which means that the consumer with the higher type will receive
an Internet message under the CRS technology:
1 >
c     
t
: (2)
Let us rst consider the case
1  a 
c     
t
; (3)
each indexed by a dierent pair of xed and variable costs.
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There is no loss of generality in restricting v to the segment [0; 1]. Changes in the
parameter  dened below are equivalent to changes in the bounds of the interval.
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then recipients with v 2 [(c      )=t; 1   a] would like to receive E-mail
messages, but are not connected. E-mail messages are sent to all connected
recipients, whose types belong to the interval [1  a; 1], and social welfare is
V +
Z
1
1 a
( + tv) dv   ca  (1  a) = ( + t  c + )a 
t
2
a
2
  :
On the other hand, when
1  a 
c     
t
;
some connected recipients do not want to receive E-mail messages, and only
recipients such that
v 
c     
t
will receive them. Social welfare is
V +
Z
1
c  
t
( + tv)dv   c(1 
c     
t
)  (
c     
t
)
= V +    c+
t
2
+
(c     )
2
2t
:
The function that links social welfare to the proportion a of the population
that is connected is represented on gure 1.
2.3 Welfare with the IRS technology
With the IRS technology, all connected recipients will be served with the
Internet technology, and welfare will be
V +
Z
1
1 a
( + tv)dv   (1  a)  F = V + ( + t + )a 
t
2
a
2
     F
if a  1+ ( + )=t. This is always satised if, as we will assume,  +   0,
that is if, once xed costs are already sunk, it is ecient to send E-mails to
the consumer of type 0. This implies that the welfare with the IRS technology
is increasing on [0; 1].
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V   
welfare
Figure 1: Social welfare as a function of a with the CRS technology. Notice
that the function is increasing for some values of a and constant for large
values, when the number of recipients who receive Internet messages is not
increasing in a.
1 
c     
t
F
c
1
a
0
V      F
welfare
Figure 2: Social welfare as a function of a. The dashed curve represents social
welfare with the IRS technology. The solid curve represents social welfare
with the CRS technology. The bold curve represents social welfare with the
optimal technology.
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Figure 3: Social welfare as a function of a. The dashed curve represents social
welfare with the IRS technology. The solid curve represents social welfare
with the CRS technology. The bold curve represents social welfare with the
optimal technology.
2.4 Welfare as a function of a
From the analysis that precedes, it is easy to compute welfare as a function of
a, when the choice of the sender's technology is endogenous. Two cases need
to be distinguished, which are represented on gures 2 and 3. In both cases
the sender chooses the CRS technology for small as and the IRS technology
for large as. Social welfare as a function of a is the maximum of two concave
functions. On gure 2, social welfare is strictly increasing in a, whereas on
gure 3 it is constant for intermediate values of a.
For future reference, note that the at portion of the social welfare curve
for the CRS technology starts at
a =
t+  +    c
t
;
whereas the intersection of the social welfare curves for the IRS and the CRS
is at a = F=c if this intersection is on the strictly increasing portion of the
CRS curve. Figure 2 is therefore relevant when
F
c

t+  +    c
t
:
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Without any this assumption, the maximum welfare with the IRS technology would
still obtained for a larger value of a than with the CRS technology.
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In this case, the sender chooses the IRS technology when a > F=c and the
CRS technology when a < F=c.
3 Coordination failures
3.1 The model
The model developed above does not allow us easily to endogenize the deci-
sion of recipients to be connected to the Internet. It does not allow us either
to discuss whether and how Internet access should be subsidized. In order
to tackle these issues, we extend the model.
The recipients are described as above, but we will explicitly model the
decision to connect or not to connect. In order to do so, assume that the
cost of connection to the Internet is equal to p. This \price" should be
interpreted as the dierence between the price paid to the ISP, the Internet
Service Provider which connects the recipient to the Internet, and the value
of the services received from the Internet, other than receiving the messages
on which this paper focuses. We assume that the ISP sector is competitive,
so that this price is also equal to the social cost of connection.
There is a continuum of identical rms of mass 1. Each rm must send a
message to all the recipients, and can be thought as an innitesimal version
of the sender described in section 2. As above, each rm has two possible
techniques for sending these messages: a \postal technique" with constant
returns to scale and cost  and an \Internet technology" with two possible
technologies described as above. The rms are social welfare maximizers,
but take their decisions in a decentralized fashion.
We will consider a two stage game. In the rst stage, senders simulta-
neously decide on the technology that they will use and recipients decide
whether to connect to the Internet; in the second stage, senders send mes-
sages.
In order to keep the paper manageably short and to facilitate the recycling
of the results of section 2, we will only be interested in equilibria in which
all the rms choose the same technology. This will be sucient to point out
the sources of coordination failures.
3.2 Equilibria
In order to ensure interior solutions, we will assume
0 <
p     
t
< 1 
c
t
; (4)
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and in order to simplify computations, we will assume
F
c

c     
t
: (5)
This implies that the function that links a to social welfare has no at part,
as in gure 2.
The second stage game is trivial: senders will send their messages e-
ciently to the recipients, and the welfare consequences of choices of technology
and connection are the same as in section 2.
In the rst stage of the game, the senders and the recipients play a simul-
taneous move game, whose equilibrium is described by the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 If
F
c
> 1 
p     
t
;
there exists only one equilibrium, and in this equilibrium rms do not invest
in the IRS technology.
If
F
c
< 1 
p     
t
 
c
t
; (6)
there exists only one equilibrium, and in this equilibrium rms invest in the
IRS technology.
If
1 
p     
t
 
c
t

F
c
 1 
p     
t
;
there exist two equilibria, one in which rms invest in the IRS technology,
and one in which they do not invest.
Proof. If a recipient of type v believes that senders have invested in the
IRS technology, his utility if he connects to the Internet is  p+  + tv while
his utility if he is not connected is   (in order to simplify notation, I neglect
the terms V
r
, V
s
and V in all the following expressions). He will connect if
 p+  + tv   ;which is equivalent to v 
p  
t
, which by (4) belongs to
(0; 1). Hence, if rms invest in the IRS technology a = 1  (p     )=t.
If rms do not invest in the IRS technology, the recipient of type v con-
nects if  p+  + tv   c   . Hence
a = 1 
p     
t
 
c
t
: (7)
The welfare of senders is computed as above. By (5) rms will invest in the
IRS technology if and only if a  F=c (see section 2.4).
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3.3 Welfare and governmental intervention
Let us now turn to the computations of the welfare associated with these
dierent equilibria. Notice rst that given the choice of technology and the
number of connected recipients, the outcome of the second stage of the game
is ecient: Internet messages are sent to the right people.
In order to compute welfare, we need to correct the computations used
in section 2 by subtracting the cost of connection pa. Therefore in an equi-
librium in which rms invest in the IRS technology welfare will be
( + t+ )a 
t
2
a
2
     F   pa =
(t  p+  + )
2
2t
     F
as a = 1  (p     )=t.
The computations are very slightly more complicated with the CRS tech-
nology, as we need to distinguish the cases where condition (3) is satised
and the cases where it is not. It is satised if a  (t   c +  + )=t, which
by (7) is equivalent to
1 
p     
t
 
c
t

t  c+  + 
t
() p  0,
and we will assume in the sequel that these inequalities hold. Then, social
welfare is equal to
( + t  c+ )a 
t
2
a
2
     pa =
(t  c  p+  + )
2
2t
  ;
with a computed through (7).
Coordination on the IRS technology is preferable to coordination on the
CRS technology if
(t  p+  + )
2
2t
     F 
(t  c  p+  + )
2
2t
  
which is equivalent to
F
c
 1 
p     
t
 
c
2t
:
This implies that in the regions where there is only one equilibrium, the
technology which will be chosen will indeed be the welfare maximizing tech-
nology. On the other hand, and not surprisingly, there can be coordination
failure on the wrong equilibrium when several equilibria exist. When the
optimal technology would be the CRS technology | that is for relatively
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large values of F | the coordination failure implies too widespread an adop-
tion of Internet technologies. When the optimal technology would be an IRS
technology, the coordination failure implies too little adoption of Internet
technology. It is in this latter case that some pump priming by the govern-
ment could be warranted in order either to encourage the adoption of the IRS
technology by the senders, or in order to make is less costly for recipients to
connect to the Internet. In particular, it can subsidize the adoption of tech-
nology in such a way that the only equilibrium is the \good" equilibrium. In
the model of this paper, the government could subsidize either the adoption
of the IRS technology or the connection to Internet of the recipients. We
will assume that it follows the following strategy: it gives a subsidy just suf-
cient to ensure that the only equilibrium is the equilibrium with adoption
of the IRS technology. This is justied if there is a cost to public funds, as is
commonly assumed in the new regulatory economics. Assume therefore that
we have
1 
p     
t
 
c
t
<
F
c
< 1 
p     
t
 
c
2t
;
and that the economy has settled on the CRS equilibrium, and let us dene
 =
F
c
 

1 
p     
t
 
c
t

:
If the government wants to subsidize the adoption of the IRS technology
in such a way that the post subsidy xed cost is equal to the right hand
side of (6), it needs to provide a subsidy equal to c. On the other hand,
subsidizing the adoption of Internet by recipients (i.e., subsidizing p) requires
a subsidy equal to t. Inequality (4) imply t  c, which is furthermore
reasonable: it is necessary and sucient for the dierence of valuation of an
Internet message between a recipient with v = 1 and a recipient with v = 0
to be greater than the cost of sending that message with the CRS technology.
Then, the optimal strategy of the government is to subsidize the adoption
of the xed cost technology by the senders, rather than the connection of
recipients.
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